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In an otherwise mundane tax opinion construing language in
the Internal Revenue Code, Oliver Wendell Holmes observed that
"a word ... is the skin of a living thought."1 As the years pass, an
idea may mature, changing its shape, its power, and its complex-
ion, even while the symbols that identify it remain constant. There
is a special vitality in words like "commerce," "equality," and
"liberty."
In southwestern England, the huge sarsen pillars that primi-
tive astronomers erected and arranged at Stonehenge centuries ago
convey a profound message about man's ability to reason and to
create. Even though the intent of the framers of Stonehenge is
shrouded in mystery and obscurity, their message is nevertheless
majestic and inspiring. Only a few miles away, the highest church
spire in England, the Salisbury Cathedral, stands as a symbol of
the creativity, the industry, and the faith of the Christian archi-
tects and engineers of the thirteenth century. A visitor to that ca-
thedral may view one of the four remaining copies of a famous doc-
ument that was signed at Runnymede early in that century.
The message to be found in the text of the Magna Carta is
neither clear nor unambiguous because its language is not plain
and its style and lettering are unfamiliar. It is, nevertheless, an im-
t Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States. This Article is the text of the
keynote address delivered on October 25, 1991 at The Bill of Rights in the Welfare State: A
Bicentennial Symposium, held at The University of Chicago Law School on October 25-26,
1991. I am indebted to Nancy Marder, not only for her valuable work as a law clerk for the
past year, but also for supplying the footnotes and editing the text of these remarks.
I Towne v Eisner, 245 US 418, 425 (1918).
The University of Chicago Law Review
portant symbol because it constitutes evidence that a once power-
ful ruler, King John, promised a group of his subjects that the oc-
cupant of the throne of England would thereafter obey "the law of
the land."2
The significance of King John's promise has been anything but
constant. In the two centuries after it was made, one English king
after another deposed his predecessor by means that violated the
law of the land. Although Henry VII was crowned after his victory
at the Battle of Bosworth on August 22, 1485, he established Au-
gust 21 as the date when he had become king, thus retroactively
condemning his former adversaries as traitors because they had
fought to defend the then-recognized occupant of the throne.3 In
the late sixteenth century, when the greatest author of all time
dramatized the life of King John, he did not even mention the
Magna Carta.4 Today, at least in America, the reign of King John
is remembered because of that document. In Elizabethan England,
however, that great symbol had either been forgotten, or at least
was not viewed with any special favor by the most popular spokes-
man for the establishment.
I.
Today we focus our attention on another great symbol-a
promise made 200 years ago that the newly-created federal sover-
eign would obey the law in this land. That promise has surely not
been forgotten, but its meaning has changed dramatically during
the two centuries of its life. To emphasize the importance and the
character of that change, I have entitled my remarks: The Bill of
Rights: A Century of Progress. Because you may wonder why I re-
fer to only one century, and why I refer to "progress," I shall begin
with a comment on my title.
This important conference is a tribute to Chicago and to this
great university. I am proud to be one of its graduates and to have
taught briefly in its law school. The University of Chicago is now
100 years old. Its participation in the development of American ed-
ucation-and more particularly legal education-unquestionably
2 "By that instrument, the King, representing the sovereignty of the nation, pledged
that 'no freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or
free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any otherwise destroyed; nor will we [not] pass
upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land.'" Hurtado v California, 110 US 516, 542 (1884).
' Rosemary Horrox, Richard III 317, 327 (Cambridge, 1989); S. B. Chrimes, Henry VII
50, 63 (California, 1972); Thomas B. Costain, The Last Plantagenets 384 (Doubleday, 1962).
' William Shakespeare, King John (Bantam, 1988).
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merits characterization as "A Century of Progress." Just two years
after the founding of the University, the Midway which adjoins
this campus was the location of the famous amusement park in the
1893 World's Fair where Little Egypt became famous for her erotic
dancing. Forty years later, in 1933, the City of Chicago celebrated
its 100th anniversary by sponsoring another enormously successful
World's Fair, which also brought fame to a nude dancer named
Sally Rand. Whether the First Amendment protects performances
like Rand's is a question that two illustrious Chicago professors,
who also wear judicial robes, recently debated in a case that I be-
lieve was correctly decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit5 and incorrectly decided by a confused and fractured
majority of the Supreme Court of the United States.'
1933 was a year in which this city-indeed the entire western
world-was in the throes of a severe economic depression. Adolf
Hitler came to power in 1933 and book-burning became fashiona-
ble in Nazi Germany. Chicago was then known throughout the
world as the home of Al Capone, the master of organized crime
who had made millions during the federal government's war on al-
coholic beverages. At that time, less prosperous criminals were
sometimes treated brutally by Chicago police officers seeking con-
fessions of guilt.7 1933 was the year in which the city's mayor was
killed in an attempt to assassinate President Roosevelt. Before the
Fair opened, there were many reasons to be pessimistic about Chi-
cago. Nevertheless, the Fair was appropriately given a name that
focused on the positive and inspired Chicagoans to build for a glo-
rious future. The Fair was named "A Century of Progress."
My selection of a title for this address reflects more than a
nostalgic memory of that World's Fair. It was motivated, in part,
by the fact that 1991 is a year in which an occasional echo of 1933
has sounded an alarming note. A volatile stock market, an ever-
escalating deficit, and disturbing reports of mismanagement of ma-
jor financial institutions remind us that in 1991-as in 1933-risk
1 Miller v Civil City of South Bend, 904 F2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir 1990) (en banc); (Pos-
ner concurring in the opinion and judgment of the court) (dance is expressive and therefore
should be protected under the First Amendment); id at 1120 (Easterbrook dissenting) (Indi-
ana law regulates public nudity, which is conduct, not speech, and therefore does not violate
the First Amendment).
6 Barnes v Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S Ct 2456 (1991) (statute requiring dancers to wear
pasties and G-strings does not violate First Amendment). Barnes was a 5-4 decision, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined by Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy. Justice
Scalia and Justice Souter each filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment.
See, for example, People v LaFrana, 4 Ill 2d 261, 265, 122 NE2d 583 (1954).
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is a characteristic of a free economy. The stagnation of the Soviet
economy-reminiscent of Germany in 1933-furnished the setting
for the attempted coup by the KGB and the military that for a
brief moment produced frightening memories of Hitler's rise to
power and the ruthless behavior of his Gestapo. In Great Britain,
1991 is a year in which the re-examination of the convictions of
alleged Irish terrorists has reminded us that trusted police officers
sometimes fabricate confessions to obtain convictions.8
In this country, while dozens of universities and communities
throughout the land are celebrating the bicentennial of the Bill of
Rights, an extraordinarily aggressive Supreme Court has reached
out to announce a host of new rules narrowing the federal Consti-
tution's protection of individual liberties. The prosecutor's use of a
coerced confession-no matter how vicious the police conduct may
have been-may now constitute harmless error.s In a totally un-
' Regina v McIlkenny, 141 NLJ 456 (1991) (police fabricated confessions and relied on
faulty forensic tests in case of alleged Irish Republican Army (IRA) terrorists known as the
Birmingham Six). Earlier, in 1989, it also came to light that the police had fabricated inter-
view notes to secure the conviction of other alleged IRA terrorists known as the Guildford
Four. See Regina v Richardson, The Times (London) 33J (Oct 20, 1989).
These and similar cases have "badly shaken" the British courts, and have led the gov-
ernment to set up a Royal Commission to study the criminal justice system in order "'to
minimize as far as possible the likelihood of such events happening again.'" William E.
Schmidt, British Court to Review 1974 Bombing Case, NY Times A4 (Sep 18, 1991). The
ten-person commission, whose members include prominent academics, journalists, and busi-
nessmen, represent "'a wide range of experience.'" Jonathan Ames, Commission Line-up
Welcomed, 88 Law Society's Guardian Gazette 4 (May 22, 1991). The commission will ex-
amine "all stages of the criminal process" and will consider "the investigation and pre-trial
process including the conduct of the police investigations and their supervision, the right to
silence, the role of the prosecutor in obtaining evidence and deciding whether to proceed
with a case and arrangements for disclosing material to the defence." Marion McKeone,
Lawyers Urge Interim Criminal Justice Reforms, 88 Law Society's Gazette 7 (Mar 20,
1991). The goal of the commission is nothing short of reform of the criminal justice system.
' Arizona v Fulminante, 111 S Ct 1246 (1991). The Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the Arizona Supreme Court, which had held that Fulminante's confessions were
coerced and that harmless error analysis did not apply. On the one hand, three of the four
members of the Court who voted to reverse concluded that no error had occurred because
the confessions were not coerced; accordingly, they had no need to reach the harmless error
issue. On the other hand, because it was clear to the five members of the majority who voted
to affirm that the introduction of the confessions had not been harmless, there was no need
for them to re-examine the settled rule that the use of a coerced confession requires auto-
matic reversal. Only the vote of Justice Scalia, who agreed that the confessions were coerced
but thought that their admission was harmless, depended on the answer to the question
whether harmless error analysis applies to coerced confessions.
As a result of the Court's decision in Fulminante, state supreme courts must now look
to their state constitutions to hold that "a coerced confession may so infect the trial process
that its admission into evidence demands reversal" and that the admission of a coerced
confession is not subject to harmless error analysis. Iowa v Quintero, 60 USLW 2165 (Iowa
Ct App, Sep 17, 1991) (en banc).
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necessary and unprecedented decision, the Court placed its stamp
of approval on the use of victim impact evidence to facilitate the
imposition of the death penalty.' 0 The Court condoned the use of
mandatory sentences that are manifestly and grossly dispropor-
tionate to the moral guilt of the offender.1" It broadened the pow-
ers of the police to invade the privacy of individual citizens," and
even to detain them without any finding of probable cause'" or rea-
sonable suspicion.' 4 In perhaps its most blatant exercise of law-
making power marching under the banner of federalism, the Court
completely rewrote the procedural rules governing post-conviction
Payne v Tennessee, 111 S Ct 2597 (1991). Here, as in Fulminante, the Court reached
out to address an issue that it need not have considered. In Payne, the Court ordered the
parties to brief and argue whether Booth v Maryland, 482 US 496 (1987), and South Caro-
lina v Gathers, 490 US 805 (1989), should be overruled. 111 S Ct 1407 (1991). As the Court's
order indicates, this was an issue that was not even raised in the petition for certiorari. See
Pet for Cert 3. The Court need not have revisited Booth and Gathers in any event because
the Tennessee Supreme Court had held that there was no Booth violation, and as an alter-
native ground, that even if there had been a Booth violation, it was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. See State v Payne, 791 SW2d 10, 18-19 (Tenn 1990).
11 Harmelin v Michigan, 111 S Ct 2680 (1991) (upholding mandatory life sentence
without possibility of parole for possession of 672 grams of cocaine). Relying on the plain
language of the Eighth Amendment and a scholarly examination of historical evidence con-
cerning the intent of the Framers, Justice Scalia argued that proportionality should not
even be considered in construing the constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments." Significantly, seven members of the Court refused to adopt an argument that
was clearly at odds with the Court's prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See, for exam-
ple, Weems v United States, 217 US 349 (1910); Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976); Coker
v Georgia, 433 US 584 (1977); Enmund v Florida, 458 US 782 (1982); Solem v Helm, 463 US
277 (1983).
In Chapman v United States, 111 S Ct 1919 (1991), the Court construed a statute to
authorize grossly disparate sentencing. .The statute required a five-year minimum sentence
for distributing more than one gram of a "mixture or substance containing a detectable
amount of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)." The Court held that it is the weight of the
LSD and the "carrier" containing it, and not the weight of the pure LSD, that determines
eligibility for the minimum sentence. Under the Court's construction of the statute, a person
distributing 1,000 doses of LSD in liquid form is subject to no minimum penalty, whereas a
person handing another person a single dose on a sugar cube, which weighs about two
grams, is subject to a mandatory five-year penalty. Id at 1931 n 9 (Stevens dissenting).
12 In California v Acevedo, 111 S Ct 1982 (1991), the Supreme Court overruled Arkan-
sas v Sanders, 442 US 753 (1979), and held that the police may search a closed container in
an automobile even though they do not have a search warrant, as long as they have probable
cause to believe the container contains contraband. See also Florida v Jimeno, 111 S Ct
1801 (1991) (consent to search car includes consent to search any closed containers found in
car).
.3 County of Riverside v McLaughlin, 111 S Ct 1661 (1991) (Fourth Amendment per-
mits individual to be detained for 48 hours without probable cause hearing).
11 California v Hodari D., 111 S Ct 1547 (1991) (individual was not "seized" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment when police officer pursued and ran toward him without
reasonable suspicion); Florida v Bostick, 111 S Ct 2382 (1991) (Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit police officers from boarding bus and searching passengers, even though officers
lack reasonable suspicion to conduct such a search, if passengers "consent" to search).
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proceedings to foreclose judicial review of even meritorious consti-
tutional claims in capital cases. 5 An attorney's untimely filing of a
notice of appeal from a state court's refusal to grant post-convic-
tion relief-a negligent misstep that until this year merely would
have foreclosed appellate review in the state's judicial sys-
tem-now bars federal review of a claim that imposition of the
death sentence on the attorney's client violated the Bill of
Rights."6
Although the Court's extraordinarily disappointing perform-
ance in 1991 can only have a sobering influence on bicentennial
celebrations such as this, the work product of a single term must
be viewed from a broader perspective. Even while American judges
are depreciating the value of liberty, this is a time when-thanks
largely to the vision of Mikhail Gorbachev, and perhaps to the
symbolic power of documents like the Bill of Rights-the voices of
freedom have produced the beautiful music of debate, controversy,
and progress in most of Eastern Europe. Perhaps, in time, the free
exchange of ideas in other parts of the world will give Americans
the incentive and the courage to re-examine the reasons why our
prison population-and particularly the number of inmates on
death row T-7steadily expands at an alarming rate 8 while armed
conflict in the streets of our cities continues to flourish.
"5 Coleman v Thompson, 111 S Ct 2546 (1991); Ylst v Nunnemaker, 111 S Ct 2590
(1991); McCleskey v Zant, 111 S Ct 1454 (1991).
11 Coleman, 111 S Ct at 2566-67.
17 Department of Justice figures indicate that as of December 31, 1980 there were 714
prisoners under sentence of death in the United States, and as of December 31, 1989 there
were 2,250 prisoners under sentence of death. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Capital Punishment 1980 1 (1981); US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice
Statistics, Capital Punishment 1989 6 (1990). In less than a decade, the total number of
prisoners under sentence of death in the United States has increased by 215%. According
to Bureau of Justice Statistics Director Steven Dillingham, since 1976 there have been 3,834
people sentenced to death. 40% on Death Row Are Black, New Figures Show, NY Times
A15 (Sep 30, 1991).
11 In the 1980s, the United States' prison population doubled, whereas during the same
time period in the Soviet Union, the prison population declined and in South Africa, the
prison population increased by only 11%. Marc Mauer, Americans Behind Bars: A Compar-
ison of International Rates of Incarceration 6 (The Sentencing Project, 1991); Ronald J.
Ostrow, U.S. Imprisons Black Men at 4 Times S. Africa's Rate, LA Times Al (Jan 5, 1991).
The United States "now has the world's highest known rate of incarceration"; it imprisons
426 people per 100,000 population, whereas the Soviet Union imprisons 268 per 100,000
population and South Africa imprisons 333 per 100,000 population. Mauer, Americans Be-
hind Bars at 3-5. In comparison, incarceration rates in Western Europe range from 35 to
120 per 100,000 population, and rates in Asia range from 21 to 140 per 100,000 population.
Id. For example, the United States' incarceration rate is almost ten times that of Japan's.
See id at 5.
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The broader perspective from which the Supreme Court's re-
cent decisions should be viewed is temporal as well as geographic.
My topic is intended to suggest that it is appropriate to consider
the significance of the Bill of Rights during an entire century and,
more particularly, to determine whether that century of jurispru-
dence represents legitimate progress.
II.
Prior to the Civil War and the subsequent adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Bill of Rights was merely a limitation
on the power of the federal government. 19 Arguably, the first ten
amendments were redundant because they did little more than
identify some of the outer boundaries of the powers that the origi-
nal Constitution conferred on the federal sovereign.20 In the first
century of its existence, the Bill of Rights was, in some respects,
comparable to the Magna Carta-a relatively static symbol expres-
sing the general idea that the federal government has an obligation
to obey the law of the land.
In the second century of its life, however, the Bill of Rights
became a dynamic force in the development of American law. The
United States Supreme Court played a major role in that develop-
ment. Its liberal-one might say "activist"-interpretation of the
word "commerce" in Article I of the Constitution created the gate-
way to a vast expansion of the federal government's power to regu-
late the lives of individual citizens.2' Increased federal regulation,
19 Barron v Baltimore, 32 US (7 Pet) 242, 247 (1833) (holding first eight amendments
inapplicable to the states); see also Withers v Buckley, 61 US (20 How) 84, 90-91 (1857).
20 "1 go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which
they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would
even be dangerous .... For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no
power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be
restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Federalist 84
(Hamilton) in Benjamin Fletcher Wright, ed, The Federalist Papers 531, 535 (Harvard,
1961).
21 See, for example, Houston and Texas Railway v United States, 234 US 342, 351
(1914) (power of Congress to regulate rates of interstate railroads includes power "to control
... all matters having such a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the
control is essential or appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency of the
interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce
may be conducted upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance"); Wickard v Fil-
burn, 317 US 111, 127-28 (1942) (Congress could control farmer's production of wheat for
home consumption because cumulative effect of home consumption of wheat by many farm-
ers would affect supply and demand relations of interstate commodity market); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v United States, 379 US 241, 258 (1964) ("Congress may ... prohibit
racial discrimination by motels serving travelers, however 'local' their operations may ap-
pear"); Perez v United States, 402 US 146, 154 (1971) ("[e]xtortionate credit transactions,
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as well as federal participation in criminal law enforcement, inevi-
tably gave rise to individual claims that the federal sovereign was
invading territory protected by the Bill of Rights. Of even greater
significance was the Supreme Court's determination that the basic
concepts described in the Bill of Rights are incorporated in the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no state may deprive any
person of liberty without due process of law. This construction of
the Due Process Clause, or as I prefer to call it, the Liberty Clause,
in the Fourteenth Amendment has transformed the Bill of Rights
from a mere constraint on federal power into a source of federal
authority to constrain state power.
In this century, most of the significant cases raising Bill of
Rights issues have, in the final analysis, actually interpreted the
word "liberty" in the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, the impact
of that Amendment on the Bill of Rights has also led to an expan-
sion of the meaning of the word "liberty" as it is used in the Fifth
Amendment. When the Court held that the racial segregation of
students in the public schools in Topeka, Kansas, violated the
Equal Protection Clause,22 simple justice indicated that the same
rule should obtain in the federal enclave known as the District of
Columbia. Unable to rely on the Equal Protection Clause because
it applies only to state action, the Court unanimously found what
is now known as the equal protection component of the Due Pro-
cess Clause embedded in the word "liberty" as it is used in the
Fifth Amendment.2" Thus, through the process of judicial con-
struction, the Bill of Rights has become a shield against invidious
discrimination by the federal government as well as a shield
against the misuse of state power.
The judiciary's reconstruction of the term "commerce" during
this century is generally accepted as legitimate by even the most
conservative critics of the Supreme Court's work product.
Respected scholars have, however, questioned the legitimacy of the
Court's doctrine incorporating portions of the Bill of Rights into
the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the
decisions incorporating the idea of equality into the Liberty Clause
though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate commerce").
These cases stand in stark contrast to some of the Supreme Court's earlier cases, such as
United States v E.C. Knight Co., 156 US 1, 13 (1895), in which the Supreme Court "allowed
but little scope to the power of Congress." Wickard, 317 US at 121-22.
22 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954).
13 Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497 (1954).
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of the Fifth Amendment.24 Because the Fifth Amendment has
been a part of the Bill of Rights throughout its 200-year history, it
is appropriate to say a few words about the latter criticism before
discussing the broader question of incorporation.
A.
If the task of judicial construction began and ended with a
grammatical and etymological analysis of legal text, or even if it
were slightly expanded to include an analysis of the original intent
of those who drafted and enacted that text into positive law, one
would expect an impartial court to reject any claim that the word
"liberty," as used in the 1791 Constitution, endorsed the revolu-
tionary idea that all men are created equal. For the text of the
Constitution in 1791, before as well as after the ratification of the
Bill of Rights, expressly approved of invidious discrimination. Arti-
cle IV provided positive protection for the institution of slavery2 5
and Article I provided that for the purpose of apportioning con-
gressional representatives, each slave should be counted as three-
fifths of a person. 6 The interest in protecting individual freedom
that animated the adoption of the Bill of Rights left these odious
portions of the original Constitution untouched. The Framers had
constructed a document that, like the fledgling nation itself, could
be described as a house divided against itself-an institution that
was half slave and half free. A Constitution that expressly toler-
ated the worst kind of discrimination could not simultaneously
condemn all irrational discrimination.
Those who argue that the meaning of the word liberty as used
in the Bill of Rights is the same today as it was in 1791 correctly
point out that the draftsmen of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment proposed no parallel provision to expand
the coverage of the Liberty Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Be-
2 See Raoul Berger, Activist Censures of Robert Bork, 85 Nw U L Rev 993, 1015
(1991); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 32-33
(Harvard, 1980).
25 "No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such
Service or Labour may be due." US Const, Art IV, § 2, cl 3.
26 "Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other
Persons." US Const, Art I, § 2, cl 3 (superseded by § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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cause the text of the 1791 Amendment has not been changed, they
assume that we should simply ignore other changes in our funda-
mental law in the process of construing that text today. The logic
of that straightforward argument leads to the conclusion that the
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Boling v Sharpe27
simply was wrong and that-as some critics suggest-the Justices
had arrogantly assumed a lawmaking role to implement their own
notions of wise social policy.
Notwithstanding the force of this hybrid plain language-origi-
nal intent argument, the judicial recognition of the Equal Protec-
tion component of the Liberty Clause of the Fifth Amendment is
so well-settled 8 that judicial opinions need not contain an expla-
nation of the legitimacy of the rule. In a symposium such as this,
however, it is appropriate to explain why the rule is firmly
grounded in our law for reasons that are even stronger than the
doctrine of stare decisis.
Just as the task of statutory construction requires a judge to
examine the entire text of the relevant statute in order to under-
stand the meaning of the provision in dispute, so does constitu-
tional interpretation often involve a study of interrelated provi-
sions. The changes in constitutional text that were effected-by the
adoption of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amend-
ments breathed new life into the entire document. The purge of
7 347 US 497 (1954) (racial segregation in District of Columbia public schools was de-
nial of Fifth Amendment right to due process).
" See, for example, Califano v Webster, 430 US 313, 317 (1977) (per curiam) (holding
constitutional under Fifth Amendment federal social security statute treating female wage
earners more favorably than male wage earners to redress "our society's longstanding dispa-
rate treatment of women"); Califano v Goldfarb, 430 US 199, 201 (1977) (federal statute
denying survivors' benefits to female wage earner's spouse unless he can show he "'was
receiving at least one-half of his support'" from his deceased wife, but not requiring male
wage earner's surviving spouse to make the same'showing of dependency, violates Due Pro-
cess Clause of Fifth Amendment); United States Dept. of Agriculture v Moreno, 413 US
528 (1973) (food stamp statute excluding any household containing individual unrelated to
any other member of the household violates Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment);
Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 680 (1973) (holding unconstitutional under Fifth
Amendment federal statutes providing that spouses of male members of the armed services
were "dependents" for purposes of military benefits, but that spouses of female members
were not unless they depended on their wives for more than one-half of their support);
Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 641-42 (1969) (holding unconstitutional state and federal
provisions denying welfare benefits to individuals who had resided in the administering ju-
risdiction less than one year); Schneider v Rusk, 377 US 163, 168 (1964) (holding unconsti-
tutional a statute treating naturalized citizens as less reliable than native born citizens be-
cause "while the Fifth Amendment contains no equal protection clause, it does forbid
discrimination that is 'so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process' ") (quoting Boiling,
347 US at 499).
[59:13
A Century of Progress
the odious provisions that infected the 1791 text made it appropri-
ate in the post-Civil War period to give the word "liberty" its ordi-
nary meaning-indeed, a meaning that is not only acceptable to
today's judges but one that presumably would have been accept-
able to an eighteenth-century jurist if the original Constitution had
not contained those odious provisions. As the Court noted in Boll-
ing v Sharpe, it has not defined the word "liberty" with any great
precision, though it has often made clear that the concept encom-
passes more than a freedom from bodily restraint. 9 Whether the
concept is broad enough to encompass the idea of equality is a
question that is easily answered by reference to the standard ar-
ticulated by Justice Holmes in his Lochner dissent: Is it a matter
of fundamental principle that has been so "understood by the tra-
ditions of our people and our law? '3
Perhaps the most articulate authority on those traditions was
a lawyer named Abraham Lincoln. He unquestionably would have
agreed with the Court's conclusion that "liberty" includes a right
to equal treatment under the law. For in his address calling for "a
new birth of freedom," 3' he identified the direct connection be-
tween the idea of liberty that was to prevail when General Lee or-
dered the Confederate Army to retreat from Gettysburg on July 4,
1863, and the idea of liberty that had prevailed when the Declara-
tion of Independence was signed on July 4, 1776. Lincoln's calcula-
tion of "four score and seven years "32 as the interval between his
dedication at Gettysburg and the birth of the nation identifies the
Declaration of Independence, rather than the Constitution or the
Bill of Rights, as the source of his understanding of the term "lib-
erty." The self-evident proposition enshrined in the Declara-
tion-the proposition that all men are created equal-is not
merely an aspect of social policy that judges are free to accept or
"' 347 US at 499.
30 "I think that the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted when it is
held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said ... that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood
by the traditions of our people and our law." Lochner v Neu, York, 198 US 45, 76 (1905)
(Holmes dissenting).
This standard has been incorporated into subsequent cases as well. See, for example,
Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 105 (1934) (Cardozo) (state is free to regulate its proce-
dure "unless in so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"); Moore v City of East Cleveland,
431 US 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (the Constitution protects the family "precisely
because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition").
"' Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov 19, 1863), in Henry Steele Commager,
ed, 1 Documents of American History 429 (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 9th ed 1958).
" Id at 428.
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reject; it is a matter of principle that is so firmly grounded in the
"traditions of our people" that it is properly viewed as a compo-
nent of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment. The posi-
tive command expressed in the Bill of Rights that the federal sov-
ereign must obey the law of the land unquestionably requires
federal judges to respect the proposition to which the forefathers
dedicated the founding of the nation itself.
B.
The text of the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law,"33 offers a different
basis for criticizing the Supreme Court's decisions applying provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights to the actions of the sovereign states.3 4
As is true of the Fifth Amendment, a literal reading of that clause
provides the individual with a guarantee of fair procedure before
the state may deprive him of life, liberty, or property, but it does
not impose any constraint on the kinds of deprivations the state
may impose on its citizens. Moreover, the general requirement that
there must be "due process"-which appears in both the Fifth and
the Fourteenth Amendments-arguably should not encompass
such specific guarantees as the right to a speedy trial, the right to
counsel, or the right to compulsory process because the Sixth
Amendment would be redundant if those rights were already pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment's general guarantee of due pro-
cess.35 The Supreme Court nevertheless has concluded in a long
and unbroken line of cases that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment does require the states not only to comply
with specific procedural protections in the Bill of Rights, but also
33 US Const, Amend XIV, § 1.
" "The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same
,meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta." Murray's Lessees v
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 US (18 How) 272, 276 (1856). In Davidson v New
Orleans, 96 US (6 Otto) 97, 101 (1877), the Supreme Court recognized that one was the
equivalent of the other. See also Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States §§ 931-32 (Carolina Academic, 1987) (originally published, Hilliard Gray,
1833). Learned Hand reached the same conclusion: "It is my understanding that the 'Due
Process Clause,' when it first appeared in Chapter III of the 28th of Edward III-about a
century and a half after Magna Carta-was a substitute for, and was regarded as the
equivalent of, the phrase, per legem terrae, which meant no more than customary legal
procedure." Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights 35 (Harvard, 1958).
"I This, in essence, is the argument that the Court accepted to explain its conclusion
that due process of law does not require an indictment by a grand jury as a prerequisite to a
prosecution for murder. See Hurtado, 110 US at 534-35.
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to respect certain substantive guarantees. The Court's interpreta-
tion of that clause makes some state action entirely invalid regard-
less of the procedures the state may employ in enforcing its
command.
The most striking evidence of the Court's willingness to ignore
the literal meaning of constitutional text is provided by cases
preventing the states from abridging the freedoms protected by the
First Amendment. The text of that Amendment provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo-
ple peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.3 6
A judge who strictly construes that text must find it difficult to
understand how it limits the power of any governmental body
other than the Congress of the United States. Even when the First
Amendment is read in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment's
command that states may not deprive anyone of liberty without
due process of law, the puzzlement remains. To find the solution it
is necessary to search judicial opinions.
Although the earliest opinions endorsing the proposition that
the federal Constitution protects speech and associational freedom
from state action were written by two of our greatest Jus-
tices-Justice Holmes and Justice Brandeis-neither of them
bothered to quote any part of the text of the First Amendment to
support that proposition. In his dissent in Gitlow v New York, Jus-
tice Holmes merely asserted: "The general principle of free speech,
it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth
Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word
'liberty' as there used .... ,3
Two years later, in his separate opinion in Whitney v Califor-
nia,38 Justice Brandeis expressly endorsed the conclusion that the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides sub-
"' US Const, Amend I.
3' 268 US at 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes dissenting). The majority did not disagree with
this proposition. It wrote:
For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the
press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Con-
gress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.
268 US at 666.
38 274 US 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis concurring).
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stantive as well as procedural protection and also the proposition
that the term liberty embraces the right of free speech. I quote two
sentences from his opinion to emphasize the non-textual basis for
his conclusion:
Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me
persuasive, it is settled that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law
as well as to matters of procedure. Thus all fundamental
rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by the
Federal Constitution from invasion by the States.3 9
The first two cases that Justice Brandeis cited to support that con-
clusion were Meyer v Nebraska,4 ° and Pierce v Society of Sisters.41
Those, of course, are the two leading cases holding that certain
fundamental rights that are neither enumerated nor expressly
mentioned in the text of the Constitution are protected from sub-
stantive deprivation by state action. Thus, although it is familiar
learning that so-called "enumerated rights" 42-those specifically
described in the first ten amendments to the Constitution-are in-
corporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, we sometimes forget that the source of the doctrine of incor-
poration was the product of judicial evaluation of the fundamental
character of the rights at stake rather than an analysis of the text
of the Constitution itself.
Moreover, as the doctrine developed, the Court unequivocally
rejected the position espoused by Justice Black that the bounda-
ries of the idea of liberty are precisely measured by the contours of
the first ten amendments. Contrary to the position Justice Black
advanced in his dissent in Adamson v California,3 the Court has
neither incorporated all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment nor retreated from the position taken
" Id at 373.
"0 262 US 390, 400 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a state law prohibiting-the teaching
of foreign languages to children because the teacher's "right thus to teach and the right of
parents to engage him so to instruct their children ... are within the liberty of the [Four-
teenth] Amendment").
268 US 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding unconstitutional a state law that forbade parents
from sending their children to private schools because it "unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control").
42 See Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be
Overruled, 59 U Chi L Rev 381 (1992), for the argument that the distinction between enu-
merated and unenumerated rights is unstable.
332 US 46, 68 (1947) (Black dissenting).
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in Meyer and Pierce that the concept of liberty includes
unenumerated rights.
During the past century, while the relevant constitutional text
has been as immutable as the Stonehenge monument, some of the
propositions of law that the text identifies have changed signifi-
cantly. Two guarantees in the Bill of Rights-one procedural and
one substantive-illustrate this point.
1.
The Sixth Amendment provides that in all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right "to have the assistance of
counsel for his defence."44 Unlike the English common law, which
perversely limited the right to misdemeanor trials, the American
right to counsel has always extended to more serious crimes. 45
Whether the Amendment merely guaranteed a lawyer to the de-
fendant who could afford to hire one or also protected the indigent
is a question that the text of the Amendment did not answer. It
seems clear, however, that the early practice in federal as well as
state courts did not require the appointment of counsel unless the
defendant made a timely request for such assistance. A series of
judicial decisions in this century has defined and expanded the
right.
Powell v Alabama,46 decided in 1932, was the groundbreaking
case. Special circumstances creating an intolerable risk of unfair-
ness in a capital case convinced a majority of the Court that the
absence of counsel had made the trial fundamentally unfair.47 A
" US Const, Amend VI.
45 Powell v Alabama, 287 US 45, 60-65, 69 (1932).
46 287 US 45.
47 The Court concluded that given the special circumstances in the record,
the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to
make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether this would be so in other crimi-
nal prosecutions, or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that it is
necessary now to decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant
is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the
court, whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of
due process of law; and that duty is not discharged by an assignment at such a time or
under such circumstances as to preclude the giving of effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate,
already adverted to, "that there are certain immutable principles of justice which in-
here in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may
disregard."
Id at 71-72, citing Holden v Hardy, 169 US 366, 389 (1898).
1992]
The University of Chicago Law Review
few years later, in Johnson v Zerbst,4s the Court construed the
Sixth Amendment to deprive federal courts in all criminal pro-
ceedings of the power to take away the defendant's liberty unless
he has, or has waived, the assistance of counsel; the Court rejected
the Solicitor General's argument that the failure to request counsel
constituted such a waiver. The rule that was applied to state crimi-
nal prosecutions during the 1940s and 1950s required counsel in all
capital cases, but not in noncapital cases unless special circum-
stances made the particular trial unfair.49 In 1963, in Gideon v
Wainwright, the Court overruled earlier decisions and dispensed
with the "special circumstances" requirement, at least in felony
cases.50 More recently, the Court has extended the rule to lesser
offenses; 51 it has also concluded that the Constitution mandates
that counsel be competent.5 2 The rule of law created by the last
clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Liberty Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has unquestionably changed while the
text of those amendments has remained the same.
2.
So it is with the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.
Their application to the states was the product of judicial opinions
that did little more than announce an interpretation of the idea of
liberty that was self-evident to the Justices. The complete explana-
tion of this conclusion appears in Cantwell v Connecticut:
We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the ap-
pellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of
law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The fun-
damental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment
embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.
48 304 US 458 (1938).
49 See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335, 350-51 (1963) (Harlan concurring).
50 Id at 344-45.
"I See Argersinger v Hamlin, 407 US 25, 37 (1972) ("absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misde-
meanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial") (footnote omitted).
52 See, for example, United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 656 (1984) (adversarial pro-
cess protected by Sixth Amendment requires accused to have counsel acting as advocate);
Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687 (1984) (convicted defendant's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel requires showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that the
deficiency prejudiced the defendant); see also Cuyler v Sullivan, 446 US -335, 348 (1980)
(actual conflict of interest adversely affecting lawyer's performance renders assistance inef-
fective); Holloway v Arkansas, 435 US 475, 484 (1978) (Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel includes right of representation by attorney who does not owe conflict-
ing duties to other defendants).
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The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has ren-
dered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress
to enact such laws.53
History teaches us that these clauses were motivated by a con-
cern about rivalry among Christian sects. The intolerance that
characterized sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England-when
royal decrees made martyrs of Edmund Campion and Thomas
More, when Oliver Cromwell's puritan roundheads covered Renais-
sance art and literature with the austere blanket of censorship, and
when English emigrants burned witches at the stake in Salem,
Massachusetts-that intolerance was the product of competition
among different groups sharing the same fundamental belief in the
resurrection of Jesus Christ. In his Commentaries on the Constitu-
tion, Justice Story explained that the "real object of the [First]
[A]mendment was not to countenance, much less to advance,
Mahometanism, or Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christian-
ity; but to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent
any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government. '54
If the protection of the First Amendment were narrowly cir-
cumscribed by the specific concerns that motivated its adoption,
presumably a democratic majority could discriminate against non-
Christian religions, against agnostics, and against atheists. The
Court, however, has unequivocally rejected that view because the
principle of tolerance embodied in the First Amendment is broader
than the particular history that was familiar to its authors.
Just as the right to speak and the right to refrain from speak-
ing are complementary components of a broader concept of
individual freedom of mind, so also the individual's freedom
to choose his own creed is the counterpart of his right to re-
frain from accepting the creed established by the majority. At
one time it was thought that this right merely proscribed the
preference of one Christian sect over another, but would not
require equal respect for the conscience of the infidel, the
atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam
or Judaism. But when the underlying principle has been ex-
amined in the crucible of litigation, the Court has unambigu-
310 US 296, 303 (1940) (footnote omitted).
5' Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution at § 991 (cited in note 34).
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ously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience
protected by the First Amendment embraces the right to se-
lect any religious faith or none at all.5
III.
It is the principle of tolerance that, in time, must provide the
answer to the controversy that inflames so many of our most sin-
cere and zealous citizens. Fueling that controversy is a disagree-
ment over the point at which a seed-to use St. Thomas Aquinas's
term56-becomes a human being. In Stanley v Georgia,57 and Gris-
wold v Connecticut,8 the Court implicitly determined that a po-
tential father, as well as a pair of potential parents, has a constitu-
tional right to waste the seeds of potential life. In Skinner v
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, the Court held that the State could
not sterilize the defendant and thus deprive him of "the right to
have offspring," which is a "basic liberty," because he had commit-
ted two or more felonies. 9 In the Cruzan case two terms ago, the
Court made it clear that the Liberty Clause protects a woman's
right to make basic decisions about the physical treatment of her
Wallace v Jaffree, 472 US 38, 52-53 (1985) (footnote omitted).
The view held by St. Thomas Aquinas is explained in a report prepared by the Con-
gressional Research Service of the Library of Congress: "For St. Thomas, 'seed and what is
not seed is determined by sensation and movement.' What is destroyed in abortion of the
unformed fetus is seed, not man." Charles H. Whittier, Catholic Teaching on Abortion: Its
Origin and Later Development (1981) (quoting In octo libros politicorum 7.12, attributed to
St. Thomas Aquinas), reprinted in Brief of Americans United for Separation of Church and
State as Amicus Curiae 17a, S Ct No 88-605 (Mar 30, 1989); see Webster v Reproductive
Health Services, 492 US 490, 567-69 (1989) (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 134 (1973).
57 394 US 557 (1969). Stanley's precise holding was, of course, that the "First and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a
crime." Id at 568 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that the Constitution
protected the rights to receive ideas and to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions
into one's privacy: "If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films
he may watch." Id at 565.
" 381 US 479 (1965) (holding Connecticut law prohibiting the purchase and use of con-
traceptives by married couples to be unconstitutional); see also Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 US
438 (1972) (holding Massachusetts statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to sin-
gle persons to be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
" 316 US 535, 536, 541 (1942). I recognize, of course, that the Court's opinion, written
when the concept of "substantive due process" was in special disfavor, relied on an equal
protection rationale. I believe this is one of several cases that is more appropriately ex-
plained as reflecting a judgment about individual liberty. See Stevens, The Third Branch of
Liberty, 41 U Miami L Rev 277, 286, 288-89 (1986).
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own body. 0 If a small tumor threatens her well-being, she has the
right-a constitutionally protected right embedded in the Liberty
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-to decide whether or not it
shall be removed.6 1 As a purely secular matter, if we regard a
growth within her body that is no larger than an acorn as just a
seed rather than a human being-as St. Thomas Aquinas did-the
constitutional predicate for the decisions in Stanley, Griswold, and
Cruzan, inexorably leads to the conclusion that the woman has a
right to decide whether to waste or to preserve that seed.
That right, of course, is not absolute. Personal decisions in-
volving the treatment of diseases, for example, must take into ac-
count the welfare of society.2 But while the individual choice may
be influenced, or even dictated, by the tenets of religious faith, the
majority's decision to override such a decision must be justified by
secular considerations. Many Americans are sincerely convinced
that the duty to protect potential life after the moment of concep-
tion is just as imperative as it is immediately after birth, when a
fetus becomes a person within the meaning of the Constitution. To
the extent that such a conviction rests on religious faith rather
than on physical differences between potential persons at different
stages of their development, it does not provide a permissible basis
for imposing the majority's will upon the individual.
The standard that should govern the judiciary in deciding
whether a legislature had an adequate secular basis for interfering
with an individual's decision respecting the disposition of a growth
within or upon her body has been debated in a number of thought-
provoking opinions.6 3 Whatever standard may ultimately be ap-
60 Cruzan v Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 110 S Ct 2841 (1990). Justice Scalia,
however, did not accept this conclusion. See id at 2861-63 (Scalia concurring).
" "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages." Schloendorff v
Society of New York Hospital, 211 NY 125, 129-30, 105 NE 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo).
11 See Jacobson v Massachusetts, 197 US 11, 27-29 (1905) (balancing individual's lib-
erty interest in declining unwanted smallpox vaccine against state's interest in preventing
disease and upholding law because it was "of paramount necessity" to state's fight against
epidemic).
63 See, for example, Thornburgh v American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists, 476 US 747, 795 (1986) (White dissenting) ("the state's interest, if compelling after
viability, is equally compelling before viability," but "compelling" interest is not required
for a right that is not fundamental); Akron v Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.,
462 US 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor dissenting) (regulation imposed on abortion is not uncon-
stitutional unless it "'unduly burdens the right to seek an abortion'" at any point in the
pregnancy); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113, 155, 163 (1973) (Blackmun) (where fundamental
rights are concerned, state regulation may be justified only by a "'compelling state inter-
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plied in answering the legal questions the abortion controversy
generates, the decisional process must recognize the validity of at
least three settled propositions.
First, neither a seed nor a fetus is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment.6 4 The meaning of that term is
unquestionably a matter of federal constitutional law that state
legislatures cannot modify. Responsible critics of the decision in
Roe v Wade-those who argue that every state should have broad
latitude in regulating abortion-necessarily reject any suggestion
that a fetus is a person prior to birth. 5
Second, the justification for the legislative decision not only
must be secular;66 it also must be rational.6  Theoretically, a prohi-
est'" and must be "narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake";
the State's interest becomes "compelling" at viability); id at 170 (Stewart concurring) (right
to abortion is "embraced within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment" and any state interests in abridging this right must "survive
the 'particularly careful scrutiny' that the Fourteenth Amendment here requires"); id at 173
(Rehnquist dissenting) ("The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic
legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid
state objective."); see also Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 543, (1961) (Harlan dissenting)
("[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause . . . is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary impo-
sitions and purposeless restraints . . . and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and
sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment"); Griswold, 381 US at 500 (Harlan concur-
ring) ("the proper constitutional inquiry is whether ... [the] statute infringes the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates basic values 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' "); Moore v City of East Cleveland, 431 US 494,
501-02 (1977) (Powell writing for the plurality); id at 542 (White dissenting).
6 Webster, 492 US at 568 n 13 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Thornburgh, 476 US at 779 n 8 (Stevens concurring).
"5 In his dissent in Roe v Wade, then Justice Rehnquist wrote,
I agree with the statement of Mr. Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion that the
"liberty," against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that
liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation with-
out due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic
legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a
valid state objective. Williamson v Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955). The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment undoubtedly does place a limit, albeit a
broad one, on legislative power to enact laws such as this. If the Texas statute were to
prohibit an abortion even where the mother's life is in jeopardy, I have little doubt that
such a statute would lack a rational relation to a valid state objective under the test
stated in Williamson, supra.
410 US at 172-73 (Rehnquist dissenting).
66 See Webster, 492 US at 568-69 (Stevens concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Cruzan, 110 S Ct at 2888 (Stevens dissenting) ("It is not within the province of
secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by regulations designed
wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectarian definitionlof life."); Hodgson v Minnesota,
110 S Ct 2926, 2937 (1990) ("[T]he regulation of constitutionally protected decisions . ..
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bition against abortion, like a prohibition against birth control,
might be justified by a general interest in increasing the population
of the community or the planet. Although such a justification
might make a good deal of sense after a community has been dev-
astated by war or plague, it would surely be irrational in urban
America today.
Third, the constitutional issues that the abortion controversy
generates cannot be entirely divorced from the topics under con-
sideration in this comprehensive symposium on the Bill of Rights.
For the Supreme Court decisions involving so-called unenumerated
rights-such as the right to marry, the right to travel, the right to
exercise dominion over one's body, and the right to decide whether
to bear or to beget a child-make it clear that those rights have
the same source as those that are enumerated in those parts of the
Bill of Rights that are enforced against the states under the incor-
poration doctrine.
IV.
That source is the idea of liberty. Although that idea is diffi-
cult to define, the Court has given it meaning in specific cases and
controversies. On the whole, the Court's decisions interpreting and
reinterpreting the idea of liberty have enlarged the concept. For
example, I have no doubt that the views expressed by Justice
Holmes and Justice Brandeis in their separate opinions in Gitlow v
New York, ' and Whitney v California,8 though then unaccept-
able to the majority, are now part of our law. The right to marry a
person of a different race, 0 or a person incarcerated in a different
must be predicated on legitimate state concerns other than disagreement with the choice the
individual has made. . . .Otherwise, the interest in liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause would be a nullity.").
67 See Meyer, 262 US at 399-400 ("liberty may not be interfered with, under the guise
of protecting the public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasona-
ble relation to some purpose within the competency of the State to effect"); Pierce, 268 US
at 535 ("rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has
no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State"); Thornburgh,
476 US at 789 (White dissenting) ("State action impinging on individual interests need only
be rational to survive scrutiny under the Due Process Clause, and the determination of ra-
tionality is to be made with a heavy dose of deference to the policy choices of the
legislature.").
e See note 37 and accompanying text.
69 See note 38 and accompanying text.
70 See Loving v Virginia, 388 US 1, 12 (1967) ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires
that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.").
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prison,' though unmentioned in the text of the Constitution, is
now protected by unanimous holdings of the Supreme Court. The
general trend of these decisions raises two questions that are far
more important than the wisdom or lack of wisdom of any particu-
lar holding. Do they represent progress toward the constitutional
goal of forming a more perfect union? If so, has that progress been
attained by legitimate means?
The answer to the first question does not depend on the
means by which the change has been accomplished. It would be
the same if every addition to the concept of liberty that judicial
decision has produced had instead been achieved by the cumber-
some process of amending the text of the Constitution. If that pro-
cedure had been followed, would we have a more perfect union to-
day than we had in 1791? Mortimer Adler has recently suggested
how that question should be answered.
Although I do not endorse his suggestion that the Court
should wield the power to invalidate unjust legislation even if it is
not unconstitutional, he is persuasive when he argues that one's
views about a just society will determine whether a change in the
law represents progress. Commenting on Judge Bork's confirma-
tion hearings, Dr. Adler wrote:
The nominee might even have been asked whether he thought
the eighteenth-century Constitution, allowing as it did for the
disenfranchisement of women, blacks, and the poor who could
not pay poll taxes, was or was not unjust. If he said that no
objectively valid principles of justice enabled him to answer
that question, he might still have been asked on what grounds
the thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, nineteenth, and twenty-
fourth amendments were adopted in subsequent years and
whether they represented progress in the direction of social
justice, regression, or neither?72
In my judgment, no matter how one defines the "just society"
or the "perfect union" mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitu-
tion, it is appropriate to characterize the amendments identified by
Dr. Adler as well as the trend of decisions that I have identified
above as progress.
" Turner v Safley, 482 US 78, 99-100 (1987) (state regulation banning marriages among
inmates without supervisor's approval violates the Fourteenth Amendment).
71 Mortimer Adler, Robert Bork: The Lessons to Be Learned, 84 Nw U L Rev 1121,
1123 (1990).
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I am also convinced that the progress in the development of
our constitutional law has been achieved by legitimate means. The
risk of unwise decisions is always present, and that concern is
greatest when the Court concludes that the strong presumption of
validity that attaches to decisions made by the elected representa-
tives of the majority has been overcome.7 3 Moreover, just as risk is
a characteristic of a free economic market, so also may every ex-
pansion of individual liberty. pose some additional danger for soci-
ety. But risk-even serious risk-is part of the price that must be
paid for freedom.
Unlike their French counterparts, the Framers of our Consti-
tution wisely refused to stake the fate of the nation on the will of
the transient majority. With equal wisdom they made no attempt
to fashion a Napoleonic Code that would provide detailed answers
to the many questions that would inevitably confront future gener-
ations.71 Instead, they used general language to construct a frame-
work allocating decisionmaking powers among different branches
of government. The provisions for the appointment and life tenure
of federal judges were obviously designed to enable them to per-
form their professional tasks impartially, without fear of popular
disapproval. Their duty to adjudicate cases and controversies obvi-
ously encompasses an obligation to interpret the text of the Con-
stitution. As Justice Cardozo reminded us, "this power of interpre-
tation must be lodged somewhere, and the custom of the
constitution has lodged it in the judges. If they are to fulfill their
function as judges, it could hardly be lodged elsewhere. ' '7 5 I firmly
believe that the Framers of the Constitution expected and in-
tended the vast open spaces in our charter of government to be
filled not only by legislative enactment but also by the common-
" As Justice Powell observed in Moore v City of East Cleveland, "[tihere are risks
when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights." 431 US 494, 502 (1977).
Even against the backdrop of Lochner, however, he concluded that although "history coun-
sels caution and restraint .... it does not counsel abandonment . . . " Id.
" Gerhard Casper has noted:
[T]he [Napoleonic] Code in many crucial provisions uses language whose level of gener-
ality is not much distinguishable from that of the Constitution. This is one reason why
the code has lasted for almost 200 years. Many of its provisions are incomprehensible
unless you consult the gloss put on them by French courts.
Letter from Gerhard Casper, Provost, The University of Chicago, to the author (Jan 20,
1992). In light of Casper's observation, perhaps my reference should have been to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code rather than the Napoleonic Code.
71 Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 135-36 (Yale, 1921).
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law process of step-by-step adjudication 6 that was largely respon-
sible for the development of the law at the time this nation was
conceived.77 That process has largely eliminated the use of coerced
confessions in criminal trials, curtailed racial discrimination in the
selection Of juries, and extended First Amendment protection to
artistic expression as well as to political speech.
Disagreement with a particular decision does not justify an at-
tack on the entire decisional process. Judgments that apply princi-
ples that are embedded in the Constitution, that are supported by
a candid attempt to explain the application of the principle and
the relevance of prior decisions, represent appropriate develop-
ments of the law even when neither text nor history supplies the
entire basis for the new decision. The work of federal judges from
the days of John Marshall to the present, like the work of the En-
glish common-law judges, sometimes requires the exercise of judg-
ment 7 -a faculty that inevitably calls into play notions of justice,
fairness, and concern about the future impact of a decision. The
fact that such concerns play a role in the decisional process does
" Cardozo's description of the judge's task in statutory construction is equally appro-
priate in describing the judge's task in constitutional interpretation:
There are gaps to be filled. There are doubts and ambiguities to be cleared. There are
hardships and wrongs to be mitigated if not avoided. Interpretation is often spoken of
as if it were nothing but the search and the discovery of a meaning which, however
obscure and latent, had none the less a real and ascertainable pre-existence in the legis-
lator's mind. The process is, indeed that at times, but it is often something more.
Interpretation, thus enlarged, becomes more than the ascertainment of the meaning
and intent of lawmakers whose collective will has been declared. It supplements the
declaration, and fills the vacant spaces, by the same processes and methods that have
built up the customary law.
Id at 14-15, 17.
" "Originalism was not the original interpretive doctrine of the framers nor of the
framing generation. It was taken for granted that the Constitution, like other legal texts,
would be interpreted by men who were learned in the law, arguing cases and writing judg-
ments in the way lawyers and judges had done for centuries in England and its colonies."
Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand Account 66
(Simon & Schuster, 1991) (footnote omitted).
For an account of the interpretive techniques used in the Framers' day, see H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 Harv L Rev 885 (1985) (arguing
that approaches to constitutional interpretation in the Framers' day differ from the ap-
proach now taken by those who say we should look to the Framers' intent). There has, of
course, been a lively scholarly debate about Powell's view. See, for example, Raoul Berger,
"Original Intention" in Historical Perspective, 54 Geo Wash L Rev 296 (1986) (challenging
Powell's claims).
"' Justice Harlan's advice to those engaged in the difficult task of defining due process
is equally apt to those engaged in the difficult task of judging: "No formula could serve as a
substitute ... for judgment and restraint." Poe v Ullman, 367 US 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan
dissenting).
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not undermine the legitimacy of the process that, for the most
part, has served the nation well for two centuries.
V.
Progress in the development of the law, to borrow again from
Justice Cardozo:
is neither a straight line nor a curve. It is a series of dots and
dashes. Progress comes per saltum, by successive com-
promises between extremes, compromises often, if I may bor-
row Professor Cohen's phrase, between "positivism and ideal-
ism." "The notion that a jurist can dispense with any
consideration as to what the law ought to be arises from the
fiction that the law is a complete and closed system, and that
judges and jurists are mere automata to record its will or pho-
nographs to pronounce its provisions." Ideas of justice will no
more submit to be "banished from the theory of law" than
"from its administration."79
An important protection against the unwise use of the judicial
power to interpret the Constitution has its origin in common-law
jurisprudence. Judges have always attached less importance to
dicta than to the portions of an opinion that are necessary to ex-
plain a judgment. The doctrine of judicial restraint, which counsels
against the use of unnecessary dicta, also imposes on federal judges
the obligation to avoid unnecessary or unduly expansive constitu-
tional adjudication." Justice Brandeis is the author of the leading
opinion expounding this doctrine-Ashwander v Tennessee Valley
Authority5 -as well as some of the Court's most inspiring words
about the idea of liberty. I quote three sentences from his opinion
in Whitney v California to illustrate the latter point:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;
79 Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 26-27 (Columbia, 1927) (foot-
notes omitted).
"' "The doctrine teaches judges to focus their attention on the issue that must be ad-
dressed in order to decide the case or controversy between the specific litigants before the
Court." Stevens, Judicial Restraint, 22 San Diego L Rev 437, 446 (1985).
8 297 US 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis concurring) ("The Court will not 'anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.' ") (quoting Liver-
pool, New York and Philadelphia S.S. Co. v Commissioners of Emigration, 113 US 33, 39
(1885)); see also Burton v United States, 196 US 283, 295 (1905) ("It is not the habit of the
court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision
of the case.").
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and that in its government the deliberative forces should pre-
vail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of hap-
piness and courage to be the secret of liberty."2
In response to Abraham Lincoln's call for "a new birth of free-
dom" in' his Gettysburg Address, s the second century of the his-
tory of the Bill of Rights witnessed significant progressive change
in the idea of liberty. Historical and textual analyses have played
an important role during that century of progress, but they did not
limit absolutely the Court's exercise of judgment in performing its
task of interpreting the underlying meaning of a dynamic concept.
Let us hope that the inability to decipher the actual intent of the
architects of the Constitution-like the inability to decipher the
Stonehenge text-will not prevent the exercise of sound judgment
from continuing the progressive development of the idea of liberty
during the third century of the life of the Bill of Rights.
82 274 US at 375 (Brandeis concurring).
83 Quoted in Commager, ed, I Documents at 429 (cited in note 31).
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